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Fox: Making the Last Chance Meaningful: Predecessor Counsel's Ethical

MAKING THE LAST CHANCE MEANINGFUL:
PREDECESSOR COUNSEL'S ETHICAL DUTY TO
THE CAPITAL DEFENDANT
Lawrence J. Fox*
Walter Mickens is dead. He has been dead for a year now. It is hard
to say who killed Walter Mickens. Some would say it was the United
States Supreme Court. Others might say it was the Commonwealth of
Virginia. I say it was in large part due to the ethical dereliction of Bryan
Saunders.
Mickens was killed for the murder of Timothy Hall.' All murders
are grisly, this one particularly so. Timothy Hall was found lying face
down on a mattress naked from the waist down except for socks
underneath an abandoned building in Newport News on March 30,
1992.2 By Saturday, April 4, Walter Mickens had been picked up by the
police,3 and on the following Monday, Walter Mickens stood before
Judge Aundria Foster, accused of capital murder and in need of a
lawyer.4 And a lawyer he got, in the person of Bryan Saunders,
appointed by Judge Foster to defend Walter Mickens against these
serious charges.5
Things did not go well from the start. Bryan Saunders did a
positively mediocre job defending Walter Mickens.6 Perhaps that was
part of the problem: was Bryan Saunders so convinced Walter Mickens
would be acquitted he did not begin to prepare for the mitigation phase
* Partner, Drinker, Biddle & Reath LLP. In his capacity as Chair of the ABA Death Penalty
Representation Project, Mr. Fox made the motion to the House of Delegates that the revised
Guidelines be approved. Mr. Fox dedicates this Article to Robin Maher, Executive Director of the
ABA Death Penalty Representation Project, without whose leadership and insight the Guidelines
would never have been promulgated.
I. See generally Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002).
2. See Mickens v. Commonwealth, 442 S.E.2d 678, 681 (Va. 1994).
3. See id at 682.
4. See Mickens v. Taylor, 227 F.3d 203, 208 (4th Cir. 2000).
5. See id.
6. See Petitioner's Brief at 7-8, Mickens v. Taylor, 227 F.3d 203 (4th Cir. 2000) (No. 00-04).
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of the trial until after the jury surprised Mr. Saunders by returning a
verdict of guilty of capital murder? 7
In any event, Bryan Saunders failed Walter Mickens completely in
the penalty phase of the trial and the jury returned a verdict of execution
against poor Walter Mickens.8 Bryan Saunders continued to represent
Walter Mickens, ultimately with no more success. 9 Walter Mickens'
appeal was denied,' 0 and he languished on Virginia's death row until
Robert Wagner undertook his petition for habeas relief."
That is when Walter Mickens got the surprise of his life. Wagner
went to the court in search of Walter Mickens' juvenile records,
something Bryan Saunders had not bothered to investigate. 12 As a result
of a clerk's error, Wagner was handed the otherwise sealed juvenile
records of Timothy Hall.' 3 He only, had them for fifteen minutes when
the clerk's error was discovered. 14 However, in that time, Wagner
learned one shocking fact: up until the moment of Timothy Hall's death,
Bryan Saunders had represented Hall on juvenile charges alleging
assault and carrying a concealed weapon. 15
Subsequent investigation revealed that Bryan Saunders'
appointment to represent the victim had been terminated on Friday,
April 3rd, by Judge Aundria Foster-the very same judge who appointed16
Bryan Saunders to represent Walter Mickens on the murder charge.
While the court knew Bryan Saunders' role on behalf of Timothy Hall,
Walter Mickens did not know until Wagner uncovered it. Only then did
7.

Cf ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL

IN DEATH PENALTY CASES, Guideline 10.10.1, text accompanying notes 104-05, 257 (rev. ed. 2003)
[hereinafter GUIDELINES] ("For counsel to gamble that there never will be a mitigation phase
because the client will not be convicted of the capital charge is to render ineffective assistance.").
8. See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 164 (2002).
9. The Supreme Court vacated Mr. Mickens' sentence and remanded for further
consideration in light of its then recent decision in Simmons v. South Carolina,512 U.S. 154, 156
(1994) (holding "where the defendant's future dangerousness is at issue, and state law prohibits the
defendant's release on parole, due process requires that the sentencing jury be informed that the
defendant is parole eligible"). See Mickens v. Virginia, 513 U.S. 922, 922 (1994). Upon remand, the
Virginia Supreme Court granted Mr. Mickens a new sentencing hearing, see Mickens v.
Commonwealth, 457 S.E.2d 9, 10 (Va. 1995), at which he was again sentenced to death. See
Mickens v. Commonwealth, 478 S.E.2d 302, 303 (Va. 1996). Mr. Mickens' appeal from that
sentence was denied. See id at 307.
10. See Mickens v. Commonwealth, 478 S.E.2d 302, 307 (Va. 1996).
11. See generally Mickens v. Greene, 74 F. Supp. 2d 586 (E.D. Va. 1999).
12. See Mickens v. Taylor, 227 F.3d 203, 207 (4th Cir. 2000).
13. See id
14. E-mail from Robert Wagner, counsel to Walter Mickens on petition for habeas relief
(September 15, 2003, 12:10:25 EST) (on file with Hofstra Law Review).
15. See Mickens v. Taylor, 227 F.3d 203, 207-08 (4th Cir. 2000).
16. See id at 208.
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Walter Mickens realize that his entitlement to one true champion in the
defense of these charges had produced a champion with a glaring
conflict of interest, a conflict of interest whose effect on Walter
Mickens' defense had to be profound.
When confronted with the undisclosed truth, however, Bryan
Saunders was not only unrepentant, he insisted that (a) there was no
conflict and (b) his performance was not affected in any way by his prior
representation of Timothy Hall.17 Indeed, he asserted that his continuing
loyalty to his former client ended with his death.' 8 This loyalty was
apparently no greater than the loyalty he had shown to Walter Mickens
in concealing a key fact, a concealment that permitted Saunders to retain
this relatively lucrative appointment, one that paid far more than the
juvenile cases, like Timothy Hall's, that Bryan Saunders had been
handling previously.
The uncovering of this astonishing information did not save Walter
Mickens' life. The idea that a lawyer, who up until the date of the
victim's death had represented the victim, could, consistent with the
rules of professional conduct, represent the person accused of murdering
his former client, is astonishing. Indeed, the representation presents one
of the most disabling conflicts of interest, a conflict whose effect no
one-not even Bryan Saunders-could appreciate.
Yet in the end, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, affirmed the
en banc Fourth Circuit opinion, 9 reversing the Fourth Circuit Panel's
granting of a new trial,2 ° concluding that while it certainly was a
conflict, an undisclosed conflict, and a conflict known to the judge who
appointed Bryan Saunders, Walter Mickens had failed to prove
prejudice. 2' Since Walter Mickens failed to prove the impossible to
prove-that the result would have been different if he had been
represented by an unconflicted lawyer-the Supreme Court affirmed the
denial of habeas relief.22 In reaching this startling conclusion, the Court
relied quite heavily on the district court's findings in the habeas
proceeding that Saunders' representation of Timothy Hall did not affect
his defense of Walter Mickens in any way. This rendered all of the
evidence habeas counsel was able to point to as effects of the conflict

17.

See Petitioner's Brief at 10-11, Mickens v. Taylor, 227 F.3d 203 (4th Cir. 2000) (No. 00-

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See Mickens v. Greene, 74 F. Supp. 2d 586, 605 (1999).
See Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d 348, 351 (4th Cir. 2001).
See Mickens v. Taylor, 227 F.3d 203, 206 (4th Cir. 2000).
Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 174-76 (2002).
See id. at 174.

04).
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mere tactical decisions, decisions made by a lawyer who was so tone
deaf he did not understand the ethical implications of his misconduct at
all.
While it is clear that Bryan Saunders breached his ethical duties to
Walter Mickens at trial and first appeal, the case also raises, in a
disturbingly stark way, the question whether Bryan Saunders did not
also breach his ethical duties to Walter Mickens during the habeas phase
of the case. You might say he was then no longer Walter Mickens'
lawyer, and that would be a true statement. But the thesis of this paperafter this long-winded introduction-is that lawyers who have
represented clients in capital murder cases at trial and appeal-not
unlike all criminal trial and initial appeal counsel, but more urgently
because of the circumstances-continue to owe important obligations to
their former clients.
These obligations have been just recently included in the latest
version of the American Bar Association's Guidelines for the
Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty
Cases:
In accordance with professional norms, all persons who are or have
been members of the defense team have a continuing duty to safeguard
the interests of the client and should cooperate fully with successor
counsel. This duty includes, but is not limited to:
A. maintaining the records of the case in a manner that will inform
successor counsel of all significant developments relevant to the
litigation;
B. providing the client's files, as well as information regarding all
aspects of the representation, to successor counsel;
C. sharing potential further areas of legal and factual research with
successor counsel; and

D. cooperating with such professionally
appropriate legal strategies as
23
may be chosen by successorcounsel.
It is my hope that this article will demonstrate that these Guidelines
reflect not just best practice, but actual ethical mandates that trial

23. GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at Guideline 10.13 (emphasis added).
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counsel, like Bryan Saunders, owe their former clients as 24those clients
negotiate the jurisprudential maze known as habeas corpus.
I. THE CONFLICTS FORMER COUNSEL MUST OVERCOME
Any realistic assessment of the duties of former counsel to a former
capital client must begin with recognition of the conflicts that may well
have developed between these two since the representation ended. Only
an honest recognition of these conflicts can permit former counsel to
treat the former client fairly as the client negotiates the next steps in the
judicial process.
First, and in some ways the most important, is the conflict between
predecessor counsel's obligation to help the former client and the desire
and inevitable reflex of predecessor counsel to wish to defend counsel's
conduct. No one wants to be accused of being ineffective. 25 No one ever
wants to be second-guessed. Everyone wants to defend his or her
conduct by asserting that it was in fact effective and that the judgments
that were made were defensible if not sound. Certainly the fact that the
former client is questioning former counsel's conduct will elicit scorned
feelings. This human reaction is an overwhelming presence in the habeas
context because of the likelihood that ineffective assistance will be
raised both because it is a claim with important constitutional
underpinnings and because this is often the first time it can be raised.26
Moreover, the state's defense to the habeas claim, of course, will be that
habeas counsel is simply second-guessing, with the benefit of hindsight,
strategic decisions made by trial counsel.27
Second, the lawyer may feel that it is the client's fault that the client
is in this position. The lawyer may have urged the client not to testify, to
plead guilty to a lesser charge, or accept life imprisonment without
24. In other words, on the issue of the duties of former counsel, as on all the issues they
address, the Guidelines "set forth a national standard of practice." Id. at Guideline 1.I(A). They are
not aspirational. Instead, they embody the current consensus about what is required to provide
effective defense representation in capital cases." Id. History of Guideline 1.1.
25. "While any criminal defense lawyer whose client is convicted is subject to the possibility
of a claim for ineffective assistance, lawyers in capital cases are virtually guaranteed such claims."
David M. Siegel, My Reputation or Your Liberty (or Your Life):
The Ethical Obligations of
Criminal Defense Counsel in Postconviction Proceedings, 23 J. LEGAL PROF. 85, 90-91 (1998).

26. See generally Massaro v. United States, 123 S.Ct. 1690 (2003) (holding that failure to
raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal does not result in its procedural
default).
27. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (mandating "the wide latitude
counsel must have in making tactical decisions ...[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance
must be highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's
assistance after conviction or adverse sentence ....
").
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parole.28 The client may have failed to cooperate in the preparation of
the defense. The client and the lawyer may have had a general falling out
or a personality clash. These occurrences are perfectly normal and that
predecessor counsel has developed antipathy toward the former client is
neither unusual nor something for which the lawyer should be
condemned.
That having been said, it is critical that predecessor counsel put
those feelings aside to determine how they can help with the habeas
proceedings. After all, counsel has not been "replaced" for this
proceeding necessarily because of a dim view of counsel's performance.
It is simply that the last person who can determine whether there is an
ineffective assistance claim and then assert it is original trial counsel.
Third, there is another impediment to cooperation that cannot be
ignored. Predecessor counsel probably was paid little enough to handle
the trial and perhaps the direct appeal. He or she will be paid nothing for
the time spent rehashing the prior experience. This is obviously a huge
disincentive to cooperation, yet it is one more thing predecessor counsel
must set aside. Of course, predecessor counsel can and will be
compelled to testify as a witness with a $20 witness fee, the only
remuneration for that time. One incentive predecessor counsel may have
is that if he or she cooperates, with successor counsel perhaps the
deposition time may be shortened. That aside, the predecessor lawyer is
an officer of the court and the former client faces the ultimate sanction.
The predecessor lawyer simply must overcome this disincentive to help
habeas counsel-who is also badly compensated or not compensated at
all-to help cut down the time new counsel must devote to developing
their case and to make successor counsel as effective as possible in
preparing the habeas case.
II. PREDECESSOR COUNSEL'S OBLIGATION TO MAINTAIN
CONFIDENTIALITY AND THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

A lawyer's duty to maintain confidentiality and to protect the
attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine survives
termination of the representation and, in fact, survives the death of the
client. 29 Predecessor counsel, in fact, has the same duties in this regard
28. See Russell Stetler, Commentary on Counsel's Duty to Seek and Negotiate a Disposition
in Capital Cases (ABA Guideline 10.9.1), 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1157, 1161-64, text accompanying
notes 15-21 (2003) (commenting that counsel must develop a trust relationship with the client in
order to get him or her to follow the attorney's advice on plea recommendations).
29. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 410 (1998) (stating that it is
"generally, if not universally, accepted... that the attorney-client privilege survives the death of the
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with respect to his former client as he did when he was representing him
in his capital trial. 30 These duties impose specific obligations on the
predecessor counsel.
Thus, predecessor counsel, it might surprise some to learn, may not
consult with successor counsel at all unless the former client consents. 1
This is because our rules governing confidentiality do not contain an
exception covering that situation.3 2 Once that consent is obtained,
however, former counsel can proceed to share everything with his or her
successor and in my view is required to do so. Full cooperation should
be the watchword of the relationship.
What former counsel may do if called as a witness requires a
different analysis. If counsel is permitted to testify, this means that the
former client has either voluntarily or been found to have waived the
privilege. However, this does not mean counsel is free to tell all in the
deposition conference room or from the witness stand. First, the client
may have waived the privilege in a way that is circumscribed and
therefore only some of the privileged information possessed by
predecessor counsel is subject to proper inquiry.33 Second, even if the
waiver is total, this only means that former counsel is permitted to testify
in response to proper questions and no more. 34 The waiver of the
privilege does not permit former counsel to meet with the other side, nor
does it permit former counsel to talk to the press or to volunteer any
information when testifying. 35 Moreover, counsel must conduct him or
herself in a way that provides present counsel with the opportunity to
raise all appropriate objections, including those addressing the scope of
the waiver.36
Too many lawyers fail to appreciate the critical difference between
what is protected by the attorney-client privilege and what is
client"); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Grolier Inc., 462 U.S. 19, 25-27 (1983); Id. at 29-31 (Brennan,
J., concurring).
30. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. (1999) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]
("The duty of confidentiality continues after the client-lawyer relationship has terminated.").
31. See id. R. 1.6(a) ("A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a
client unless the client consents after consultation.").
32. See generally id. R. 1.6.
33. See Waldrip v. Head, 532 S.E.2d 380, 387 (Ga. 2000); In re Dean, 711 A.2d 257, 259
(N.H. 1998); State v. Taylor, 393 S.E.2d 801, 805 (N.C. 1990).
34. See MODEL RULES, supra note 31, R. 1.6, comment at 12; cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS ch. 5, top. 2, tit. C, introductory note (2000) ("Application of
waiver or exception to a communication does not relieve a lawyer of the legal duty otherwise to
protect the communication against further disclosure or use adverse to the client.").
35. See id.
36. See id.
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confidential: they confuse the fact that the former only applies when the
lawyer is called to testify, and the latter governs how the lawyer
conducts herself off the witness stand.3 7 As a result, when the privilege
has been waived, too many lawyers are too quick to respond to informal
inquiries-from the prosecution (of all people), the press, or othersfailing to recognize that such uncompelled responses are only
permissible when the former client has given his permission.
Indeed, it is impermissible under our rules for the prosecution to
seek privileged or confidential information from the former counsel.
Rules 1.6 and 3.4 make it quite clear that this may not be done. 3' And
the case law is to the same effect. 39 The rule governing the
confidentiality that must be maintained by former counsel can be simply
stated: even under oath, predecessor counsel may volunteer no
information without the express consent of the former client or former
client's present counsel.

III. WITHDRAWING AND PROTECTING THE CLIENT
By definition, former counsel has withdrawn from the
representation. If one thinks about it in terms of the ethics rules, the
lawyer has been forced to withdraw because the lawyer who represented
the client at trial and first appeal, by definition, has a conflict of interest:
the lawyer cannot argue his own ineffectiveness. Ineffective assistance
of counsel is an issue that every habeas counsel must thoroughly
explore, 40 if not assert; even the mere exploration of such a claim is not
an inquiry to which trial counsel can bring the necessary objectivity.

37. See MODEL RULES, supra note 30, R. 1.6 cmt. ("The attorney-client privilege applies in
judicial and other proceedings in which a lawyer may be called as a witness or otherwise required to
produce evidence concerning a client. The rule of client-lawyer confidentiality applies in situations
other than those where evidence is sought from the lawyer through compulsion of law.").
38. See id. R. 1.6(a); id R. 1.6 cmt. ("The duty of confidentiality continues after the clientlawyer relationship has terminated."); id. R. 3.4 (discussing counsel's obligation to be fair to
opposing party and counsel); see generally id. R. 8.4(d) ("It is professional misconduct for a lawyer
to: engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration ofjustice.").
39. See Ackerman v. Nat'l Prop. Analysts, 887 F. Supp. 510, 518-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); In re
Shell Oil Refinery, 143 F.R.D. 105 (E.D. La. 1992), amended and reconsidered on other grounds,
144 F.R.D. 73 (E.D. La. 1992); Rentclub, Inc. v. Transamerica Rental Finance Corp., 811 F. Supp.
651, 654-57 (M.D. Fla. 1992); MMR/Wallace Power & Indus., Inc. v. Thames Assoc., 764 F. Supp.
712, 724-28 (D. Conn. 1991).
40. See GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at Guideline 10.7(B)(1) ("Counsel at every stage have an
obligation to conduct a full examination of the defense provided to the client at all prior phases of
the case. This obligation includes at minimum interviewing prior counsel and members of the
defense team and examining the files of prior counsel.")
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This is an institutional and inevitable conflict, and therefore it is
one that gives particular meaning, in my view, to the obligation
contained in Rule 1.16 for the lawyer to take steps to protect the client's
interest to the extent reasonably practicable. 41 This rule requires, inter
alia, reasonable notice to the client, surrendering the client's papers and
property, and returning unearned fees.42 While the first and last are
unlikely to be an issue in a capital representation, the duty to surrender
the files springs from and is informed very much by the former lawyer's
original obligation to maintain the files during the representation.
A.

MaintainingFilesDuring the Representation

The duties of trial counsel to his client when the client will become
a former client start-as they do for every lawyer in every client
relationship-on the very first day of the engagement. One of the
fundamental duties under the general heading of competence enshrined
in Model Rule 1.1 is maintaining the file in a way that will not only
provide effective services during the representation, but also permits the
file to be transferred to successor counsel at any time. 43 While no lawyer
wants to begin a representation thinking of its timely or untimely
demise, lawyers must recognize that: (1) no lawyer can carry it all in her
head; (2) the client can switch lawyers at any time for any reason; (3)
lawyers may terminate the representation at any time, even for no
reason, so long as there is no material adverse effect on the client;
(4) lawyers retire or pass away; and (5) the client may need the file long
after the representation is terminated.
In capital cases, the foregoing is not simply a possibility. There is
virtual certainty that if the capital representation ends in a sentence of
death, new counsel will (one would hope) be obtained to press whatever
avenues of relief a habeas proceeding might offer. Thus, the capital
defense lawyer has an even heightened obligation beyond that in the run
of the mill matter, to maintain an orderly file, permitting anyone who
follows to know what steps the lawyer considered, what steps the lawyer
took, what information was available, what motions were contemplated,
41.

See generally MODEL RULES, supra note 31,

R. 1.16 ("Declining or Terminating

Representation").
42. See id. R. 1.16(d) ("Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the
extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the
client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which
the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been earned.").
43. Cf id. R. 1.1 ("Competence") ("Competent representation requires the legal knowledge,
skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.").
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what motions were filed, what areas of inquiry and research were
suggested, which were pursued and which were rejected, who was
interviewed (and who was not), how jury selection was conducted, and
every other material step counsel undertook. 4 These files should not
only be complete, they should be well-organized so that with little effort
all of this can be accomplished.
This is undoubtedly a massive undertaking, but its scope is no
excuse for its not being undertaken. Indeed, it is all the more reason why
it must be done in a complete and orderly way. A former client and his
habeas counsel start off with enough of a handicap in trying to overturn
a sentence of death to have the representation further hampered by a
sloppy and incomplete file.
To put a fine point on this obligation, just consider two of the most
common habeas challenges and how they relate to maintenance of
proper files. The first is the claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.
While surely no one handling a capital case at trial wants to think about
the need for such a claim, it is also not difficult to imagine how the
failure to maintain a complete and well-organized file can make
successor counsel's task far more difficult. This file is the record of what
has been considered and what has been done. If the file is deficient,
successor counsel will be left with baffling question marks. The
incomplete file will also arm the prosecution with an argument that in
fact, though the file is silent, counsel surely was effective.
Second, the failure of the prosecution to share exculpatory
information with the defense often leads to Brady claims by habeas
counsel.45 Oftentimes, the defense to such claims will be that the
information was made available. 46 An incomplete or sloppily kept file
will make it more difficult for habeas counsel to refute this assertion.
B.

Former Counsel'sDuty When FilesAre Incomplete

Let us assume that beleaguered counsel, underpaid and
understaffed, did not maintain the files in a pristine condition. Successor

44.

See GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at Guideline 10.13, commentary ("All members of the

defense team must anticipate and facilitate the duty of successor counsel ... to investigate the
defense presentation at all prior stages of the case... [As] there may be issues as to whether the
government produced certain evidence[,] counsel's files should be maintained in a manner sufficient
to enable successor counsel to answer questions of this sort through appropriate
documentation .... ").
45. See generally Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
46.

See, e.g., Castillo v. Johnson, 141 F.3d 218, 233 (5th Cir. 1998); Norris v. Schotten, 146

F.3d 314, 333-35 (6th Cir. 1998); Mills v. Singletary, 63 F.3d 999, 1015-16 (11 th Cir. 1995).

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol31/iss4/10

10

Fox: Making the Last Chance Meaningful: Predecessor Counsel's Ethical

20031

MAKING THE LAST CHANCE MEANINGFUL

counsel is confronted with unlabeled boxes, files haphazardly arranged,
and stacks of disorganized papers randomly scattered in a conference
room. Does this situation place any ethical obligation on former
counsel? In my opinion, the former counsel has a clear ethical obligation
to take whatever time is required to organize the files and help successor
counsel understand what is available and what it reflects. Quite simply,
trial counsel has violated a fundamental aspect of the duty of
competence. Counsel was required to properly maintain the files under
Model Rule 1.1. Counsel failed to do so, and no complaints about
overwork and undercompensation can serve as an excuse for this
dereliction.
What happens next? A malpractice action against predecessor
counsel may be appropriate. Similarly, a meritorious disciplinary
complaint could be filed. The problem is that neither of those provides
any real relief to the death row defendant. What is needed, and what I
believe is ethically mandated, is for predecessor counsel to spend all the
time that is necessary to bring habeas counsel up to speed. The former
client's injury is being suffered right now and must be corrected
immediately. It is no consolation to know the former client's estate may
have a cause of action three years from now.
IV.

COOPERATION ON STRATEGY

Must predecessor counsel fall on his or her sword, admit
ineffectiveness and suffer the ignominy and shame that follows? That is
a great question. A couple of points are clear. First, counsel is required
to communicate with a client or former client regarding legal
malpractice. While it comes as a surprise to lawyers to learn this is so, in
fact there is ample authority that concludes a lawyer, as a fiduciary, must
put the client's interest ahead of his or her own and inform the client of
the failing, because in large part the differential in expertise between the
lawyer and the client means that the client will rarely be aware that that
is what has occurred. 47 The conscientious lawyer must consider the
extent to which his or her conduct fell below the standard of care and act
accordingly.
Moreover, counsel, at least in a capital case, should consider how
rare it is among all the homicides that take place each year in any given
state that an accused actually ends up on death row. For example, in
47. See generally Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 491 P.2d 421 (Cal.
1971); McClung v. Johnson, 620 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. App. 1981); cf In re Tallon, 86 A.D.2d 897
(N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
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2001, with 15,980 homicides,48 155 condemned joined the population of
death row. 49 Given that circumstance, it is fair at least to wonder why
that tragic result happened in this case and whether some soul-searching
is not in order to determine whether constitutionally cognizable error in
counsel's performance did not play some role, particularly when a
recognition of one's failings may not only make one a better lawyer next
time around but provide one's former client with an opportunity to
escape a date with the executioner.
The question then arises whether this obligation to protect the client
does not mean something more in the context of a criminal prosecution
and in particular for a defendant under a sentence of death. Should this
requirement not be read to require full, not grudging, cooperation with
successor counsel? This may be what the California Bar was trying to
assert when it concluded:
[T]he Rules of Professional Conduct impose a duty upon trial counsel
to fully and candidly discuss matters relating to the representation of
the client with appellate counsel and to respond to the questions of
appellate counsel, even if to do so would be to disclose that trial
counsel failed to provide effective assistance of counsel. This decision
is in accord with the general rule that the attorney owes a50 duty of
complete fidelity to the client and to the interests of the client.
As one observer has noted, "the strategic thinking of the lawyer,
and learning this strategic thinking is absolutely critical to the thorough
presentation of a postconviction claim[,] ... should be routinely and
openly presented to the postconviction counsel." 5 '
This is not a plea for counsel to lie or make it up. Lawyers, of
course, are forbidden from that and indeed have a duty of candor to the
tribunal under Rule 3.3.52 It is, however, a plea to set aside natural

48. FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2001 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 19 (2002) (reporting
number of murders and non-negligent manslaughters, defined as "the willful (nonnegligent) [sic]
killing of one human being by another," as reported to the Bureau's Uniform Crime Reporting
System for the year 2001), available at http://www.fbi.gov/usr/cius_01/0 crime.pdf.
49.

TRACY L. SNELL & LAURA M. MARUSCHAK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 2001 9 (2002) (reporting number of prisoners under sentence of death
received
by
state
and
federal
prison
systems
in
2001),
available
at
http://www.ojp.usdog.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cp01 .pdf.
50. State Bar of Cal. Standing Comm. on Prof l Responsibility & Conduct, Formal Op. 1992127 (1992), available at http://www.calbar.ca.gov/calbar/htmunclassified/ca92-127.html.
51. See Siegel, supra note 25, at 114 ("While any criminal defense lawyer whose client is
convicted is subject to the possibility of a claim for ineffective assistance, lawyers in capital cases
are virtually guaranteed such claims.")
52. See generally MODEL RULES, supra note 30, R. 3.3 ("Candor Toward the Tribunal").
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feelings and ego to help the former client and successor counsel in this
difficult process.
Does this cooperation become an ethical mandate? It is hard to
assert that a lawyer who honestly believes that he or she made the proper
decision has some ethical or other obligation to confess to an error the
lawyer did not commit. Indeed, Rules 3.3 and 4.1 require a contrary
result.53 Short of that, a lawyer whose former client faces the ultimate
sanction should cooperate fully, within the Rules' limitations, in order to
give real meaning to Rule 1.16's injunction to protect the client upon
withdrawal.
V.

CONCLUSION

A lawyer represents a client in jeopardy of capital punishment. It
all ends badly. Now the client's last clear chance for relief lies in the
granting of a writ for habeas corpus. Even if former counsel is not
prepared to move heaven and earth to save the former client, the new
ABA Guidelines officially recognize an idea that has already been
commonly acknowledged in practice-that the former lawyer has a
significant obligation to help extricate the former client from his present
plight. 54 And once it is understood that this long-standing obligation has
a firm foundation in the mandates of our profession's rules of
professional conduct, the former counsel should recognize that what he
or she has is not merely a hortatory goal, but a firm obligation. An
obligation which, if left unfulfilled, might well result in a violation of the
applicable rules, a disciplinary sanction, and guilt that the lawyer failed
to do everything he or she could to save a former client.

53. See generally id.; MODEL RULES, supra note 30, R. 4.1 ("Truthfulness in Statements to
Others").
54.

RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE at 485 n.20 (4th ed. 2001).
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